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We consider a setting with two teams, each with a number of players. There is an ordering
of all players that determines outcome of matches between any two players from the
opposing teams. Neither the teams nor the competition designer know this ordering, but
each team knows the derived ordering of strengths among its own players. Each team
announces an ordering of its players, and the competition designer schedules matches
according to the announced orderings. This setting in general allows for two types of
manipulations by a team: Misreporting the strength ordering (lack of truthfulness), and
deliberately losing a match (moral hazard). We prove necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for a set of competition rules to have the properties that truthful reporting are dominant
strategies and maximum effort in matches are Nash equilibrium strategies, and certain
fairness conditions are met. Extensions of the original setting are discussed.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Once upon a time in ancient China, the emperor Qi threw down the gauntlet to his minister Tian for a horse race.
The rule was that each of them would announce a ranking of his three horses and each time the two horses with the
same rankings would race. As the story goes, Tian learnt that his best horse was not as good as the emperor’s best
but better than his second best one, and his second best one was not as good as the emperor’s second best but better
than the emperor’s worst one. Knowing that the emperor would be conﬁdent enough to announce the true ordering,
the clever minister put forward his worst horse ﬁrst and his best horse second followed by his second best. As a result,
while Tian’s worst horse lost badly to the emperor’s best horse in the ﬁrst match, he won the second and third matches
nevertheless by taking the advantage of mismatches. Tian explained afterwards his strategy to the emperor and its
potential application in military matters and as a result, he was promoted to be the general in chief.
Similar examples abound.1 A somewhat more recent example is the international team competition of table tennis. The
schedule is a modiﬁcation of the horse racing one by adding two matches between the ﬁrst player and the second player
from each team. Smart coaches can also beneﬁt from strategically reporting the orderings. We will return to these examples
later after we formally deﬁne the problem, which is henceforth called team competition problem.
Competition among teams, each consisting of several players, presents at least two types of challenge. The ﬁrst regards
the desirable outcomes. Typically, the basic information is the relative strength of pairs of players, one from each team.
✩ An earlier version entitled “Team Competition” appeared in Proceedings of AAMAS’09.
* Corresponding author.
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1 For a related example in game theory, the Colonel Blotto game, cf. Section 7.0004-3702/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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with one strong player and the rest very weak players beat a team consisting entirely of mediocre players? This amounts to
deﬁning the appropriate social-choice functions in this domain. One contribution of this paper is to establish criteria for such
functions; speciﬁcally, we adapted the notions of player anonymity, team anonymity, monotonicity, and Pareto eﬃciency to
this setting.
The second challenge is that relative strengths among players are typically not common knowledge. Each team has
private information about its players, and the only objective way of getting this information is to play a match and observe
the outcome. Playing all pairwise matches is usually not feasible, and so typically a competition among teams proceeds
as follows: The teams announce a ranking of their players, and the organizer schedules individual matches based on these
rankings according to a formula announced in advance. The matches then take place, and each match adds a certain score
to the team of the winner. The team with the highest aggregate score wins the competition. But this opens the door to two
ways in which teams can manipulate the outcome: It can misreport the true ordering of their players, and it can throw a
match (that is, deliberately lose). This is the problem of implementing the social-choice function, or of mechanism design
(see [10,14] for introductions).
Another contribution of this paper is the identiﬁcation of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for implementing in dom-
inant strategies social choice functions which satisfy the speciﬁed axioms. That is, identifying conditions under which it is
best for a given team to truthfully reveal the ordering among its players – no matter what the other team does, as well
as the conditions under which it is best for a given team to play its best in each match – knowing the other team also
plays its best. These results are extended to a more general setting where the outcome of a match between two players is
probabilistic – decided according to a winning probability matrix [6].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: We next formulate the team competition problem as a mechanism
design problem, identify the basic forms of mechanisms and state the desirable properties in this domain. In Sections 4
and 5, we characterize the conditions under which the mechanisms satisfy these properties. We then generalize our results
in two directions in Section 6 and discuss related work in Section 7. Finally in Section 8, we brieﬂy discuss future research
topics related to team competition.
2. Basic models
We now give the mathematic models for analyzing team competition.
2.1. Team competition environments
Team competition environment is the setting where the designer operates.
Deﬁnition 2.1. A team competition environment C is a tuple (A, B,Θ, O , R), where
• A = {a1, . . . ,an} is the set of players of team A.
• B = {b1, . . . ,bn} is the set of players of team B .
• Θ is the set of possible states, where:
– Each state θ ∈ Θ uniquely deﬁnes a linear order >θ on A ∪ B . If a >θ b, then a beats b in state θ .
– We denote by θA and θB the orderings on A and B that are derived from θ respectively. θA and θB can be seen as
the private information of A and B . We denote by ΘA and ΘB the sets of all possible θA and θB .
• O = {(sA, sB) | sA, sB ∈ R} is the set of outcomes of the competition. sA and sB are the scores for teams A and B ,
respectively.
• R is a preference relation over O .
We consider R to be the one that team A weakly prefers (sA, sB) to (s′A, s′B) iff
sA  s′A and sB  s′B ,
and team A strictly prefers (sA, sB) to (s′A, s′B) iff(
sA > s
′
A and sB  s′B
)
or
(
sA  s′A and sB < s′B
)
.
Team B has the opposite preference. We note that when sA > s′A and sB > s′B , the preference between (sA, sB) and (s′A, s′B)
is not deﬁned.2
An easy way to complete the preference deﬁned above is to restrict a mechanism on certain set of outcomes satisfying,
for each state θ , sA + sB = c, for some constant c. Such a mechanism is called a constant-sum mechanism.
2 We will get back to another type of preference where each team is not so sensitive about scores but only cares about winning or losing. In this case,
2 : 3 is as desirable as 3 : 4.
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Typically, each team communicates with a mechanism by sending it a message. In team competition context, such a
message is conﬁned to the form of an ordering of players of that team. A strategy of each team then speciﬁes how to
choose among its orderings of players, given its true ordering of strengths.
Deﬁnition 2.2. S A : ΘA → LA , is the set of A’s pure strategies that map A’s private information to a linear order on A,
where LA is the set of all linear orders on A. Similarly for SB .
When there is no restriction on Θ , both ΘA and LA denote the set of all permutations on A. We use different notations
here to clarify that ΘA is the set of private information (types) based on which A chooses an ordering in LA to report.
Similarly, we can deﬁne the set of A’s mixed strategies to be σA : ΘA → Ω(LA), where Ω(LA) is the set of probability
distributions over LA . We assume both teams are risk neural. As a result, when they play a mixed strategy, the outcome is
equivalent to the expected score proﬁle.
2.3. Generalized round-robin mechanisms
Deﬁnition 2.3. Given a team competition environment and a message proﬁle (LA, LB) reported by A and B , a generalized
round-robin mechanism speciﬁes an outcome via a matrix C , where:
• Each entry ci, j in C denotes the score assigned to the match between ai and b j , where ai is the i-th player of LA and
b j the j-th player of LB .
• The winner of the match gets ci, j and the loser gets 0.
• The total score that team A can get in state θ is sA =∑(ai>θb j)∈A×B ci, j . Similar for sB .
• Such a pair (sA, sB) creates an outcome in O .
In comparison with standard mechanism deﬁnition [11, Chapter 10], the matrix C plays the role of an outcome function:
for each state, the matrix maps the reports from A and B to an outcome (sA, sB) ∈ O . Note that sA + sB = c, where
c =∑1i, jn ci, j , which implies that every generalized round-robin mechanism is constant-sum and the preference relation
P over O is complete.
Note that there are potentially n2 matches since there are n2 entries in the matrix. However, if ci, j = 0, then a match
between ai and b j is not necessary. Note also that, if ci, j = 0, it does not necessarily mean that there is only one match
between ai and b j . It means that the sum of scores of the matches between ai and b j is ci, j .
Both examples mentioned at the beginning of the paper can be categorized as generalized round-robin mechanisms,
with the following score matrices:
Example 2.1 (Horse race).[1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
]
.
Example 2.2 (Table tennis).[1 1 0
1 1 0
0 0 1
]
.
2.4. Sequential mechanisms
Consider a generalized round-robin mechanism where there are 4 matches: (a1 vs b1), (b1 vs a2), (a2 vs b2) and
(a1 vs b2). Suppose these matches take place sequentially and the ﬁrst player always beats the second. We can predict
after the ﬁrst three matches that a1 >θ b2, without observing the outcome of the fourth one.
The above intuition can be realized in designing more compact mechanisms called sequential mechanisms, where matches
take place sequentially and the current match is jointly scheduled by the reported orderings as well as the results of
previous matches.
Deﬁnition 2.4. Given a team competition environment and a message proﬁle (LA, LB) reported by A and B , a sequential
mechanism is a tuple (H, fn, Rs) where
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They are deﬁned inductively as follows:
– ∅ ∈ HN .
– If h ∈ HN , then h :: (ai > b j) ∈ H and h :: (b j > ai) ∈ H . It says if h is a nonterminal history, by concatenating it with
the match where ai beats b j or b j beats ai , a new history is generated. The new history can be either terminal or
nonterminal.
• fn : HN × LA × LB → A × B , is a next function that maps each nonterminal history as well as the reported messages to
a pair of players to compete in the next match.
• Rs : HT → O , is a scoring rule that maps each terminal history to an outcome, that is, a score proﬁle.
Sequential mechanism generalizes round-robin mechanism in a trivial sense that every round-robin mechanism can be
represented by a sequential one: the one that schedules a list of independent matches sequentially. Quite often, it is more
interesting to focus on certain speciﬁc classes of sequential mechanisms. For instance, the following “knock-out” competition
is popular in the Go community.
Example 2.3 (Knock-out competition). Upon receiving the reported lists {a1, . . . ,an} and {b1, . . . ,bn},
• a1 vs b1 will be initiated as the ﬁrst match.
• In the following rounds, if the current match is ai vs b j , then the next function assigns ai+1 vs b j if b j beats ai and
ai vs b j+1 otherwise.
• The set of terminal histories are those with every player in one team has lost. The scoring rule assign the winning team
n points and the losing team the number of matches that it wins.
There are at most 2n − 1 matches in a knock-out competition because each match eliminates one player. This property
perfectly ﬁts into the context of Go competitions, where a match normally takes hours.
3. Desirable properties
There are several desirable properties a designer wishes to implement. In the horse race story, one might hope for
a mechanism that forces both teams to report the truth. Assuming the truth, one might hope that the outcome of the
match should fairly reﬂect the true strengths: it seems fair to anticipate the emperor to win. One might also hope the total
number of matches to be as small as possible. We present some of the standards using social-choice function and ask what
mechanisms truthfully implement the social choice function.
3.1. Social-choice functions
As already mentioned, a social-choice function describes which outcome should occur for a given state.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A social choice function f : Θ → O maps a state to an outcome.
3.1.1. Axioms
The ﬁrst axiom on a choice function f is the so-called player anonymity, which says players are indistinguishable inside
a team.
Deﬁnition 3.2 (Player anonymity). If p : A → A is a permutation function and f (θ) = o, then f (θ ′) = o where θ ′ is obtained
from θ by replacing each a ∈ A by p(a). Similar for team B .
For example, state
a >θ1 b >θ1> b
′ >θ1 a′,
should lead to the same outcome as state
a′ >θ2 b >θ2> b′ >θ2 a,
as well as state
a >θ3 b
′ >θ3> b >θ3 a′.
The second axiom, team anonymity, says that a choice function f does not discriminate for or against one particular
team.
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where θ ′ is obtained from θ by swapping each a ∈ A and p(a) ∈ B .
For example, again if f (θ1) = (sA, sB) and θ1 is as follows:
a >θ1 b >θ1> b
′ >θ1 a′,
then f (θ4) = (sB , sA), where θ4 is as follows:
b >θ4 a >θ4> a
′ >θ4 b′.
The third axiom is the so-called monotonicity, which says no worse outcome is brought about for a team if none of its
players falls in the overall ranking.
Deﬁnition 3.4 (Monotonicity). For any two states θ and θ ′ , if f (θ) = o, f (θ ′) = o′ and θ ′ is an improvement to θ for team A,
then o′ is at least as good as o to A. A state θ ′ is an improvement to another state θ for team A, if ∀a ∈ A, the ranking of a
in state θ ′ is improved or stays the same as in state θ . Similar for team B .
Finally, the last axiom, called Pareto eﬃciency, says that if one team has the better i-th best player for all i, then it
should get a no lower score in the ﬁnal outcome.
Deﬁnition 3.5 (Pareto eﬃciency). If in any state θ satisfying ∀0  i  n, the i-th ranked player of team A is better ranked
than team B , then f (θ) = (sA, sB) satisﬁes sA  sB .
For example, if
a >θ5 b >θ5> a
′ >θ5 b′,
then sA  sB . Pareto eﬃciency is not independent of team anonymity and monotonicity since we can prove the latter two
properties imply Pareto eﬃciency.
Proposition 3.1. A social choice function f satisﬁes Pareto eﬃciency if it is both anonymous and monotonic.
Proof. Suppose otherwise, then there exists a state θ such that ∀0  i  n, the i-th ranked player ai of team A is better
ranked than that bi of team B and sA < sB . Now we swap the role of ai and bi for all i in θ and we call the new state θ ′ . By
team anonymity, we have f (θ ′) = f (sB , sA), which is a worse outcome than f (θ) for B . However, since θ ′ is an improvement
to θ for team B , the new outcome should be no worse for team B by monotonicity. This leads to a contradiction. 
3.1.2. Examples of social-choice functions
It is not diﬃcult to see that the following four social-choice functions satisfy all the axioms mentioned above.
• Borda Count: Suppose >θ on A∪ B with |A∪ B| = 2n, we assign the top-ranked player 2n−1 points, the second-ranked
2n − 2 points, . . . , and the last-ranked 0 point. Let sA be the sum of points of all the players in A. sB can be deﬁned
symmetrically. fBC(θ) = (sA, sB).
• Horse Race: Suppose in θ , (a′1 > a′2 > · · · > a′n) and (b′1 > b′2 > · · · > b′n). Deﬁne sA = |{(a′i,b′i) | a′i >θ b′i}| and sB = n− sA .
fHR(θ) = (sA, sB).
• Max: Suppose the best players of A and B by θ are a and b respectively, then fMax(θ) = (1,0) if a >θ b and fMax(θ) =
(0,1) otherwise.
• Min: Suppose the worst players of A and B by θ are a and b respectively, then fMin(θ) = (1,0) if a >θ b, fMin(θ) = (0,1)
otherwise.
In other words, fBC sums up the rankings of all players in each team and fHR the winnings of pairwise comparisons
between players of the same rank. In addition, fMax and fMin compare the best and worst players respectively. fBC is a
natural extension of the seminal rank-order (aka Borda count) voting rule to the context where voters’ objectives are to
select a cabinet of n candidates. fHR captures a class of barter auctions where each bidder places n non-monetary, indivisible
bids to compete for n equally valuable objects. One fair allocation for such an auction is that of fHR . fMax is widely employed
in Olympic competitions such as the Long Jump, when each athlete is thought of as a team, each jump attempt is thought
of as an individual player and the gold medal is for the athlete with the longest jump attempt, that is, the choice of fMax .
fMin , on the other hand, embodies the preservative attitude of maxmin, according to which a set of players are evaluated at
their worst player.
754 P. Tang et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 749–7663.2. Truthfulness and truthful implementation
Deﬁnition 3.6. A mechanism is dominant-strategy truthful if for every state and each team, reporting truthful order yields
a no worse outcome than any other order, no matter what the other team does.
An outcome o1 is worse than o2 to team A if A strictly prefers o2 to o1. Aware of its private information, each team in
such a mechanism would choose to report its truthful ordering because it is in its best interest to do so.
Deﬁnition 3.7. A mechanism M truthfully implements a social-choice function f in dominant strategies, if M is dominant
strategy truthful and if both teams report truthfully, the resulting outcome coincides with the one prescribed by f .
If a mechanism truthfully implements a choice function in dominant strategies, both teams prefer to report truthfully.
Moreover, truthful reports lead to the desirable outcome prescribed by f . For example, fHR and fMin , when thought of as
mechanisms, are not truthful while fMax is truthful as a mechanism.
3.3. Frugality
As we shall show, the canonical generalized round-robin mechanism whose score matrix consisted of all 1’s, is always
truthful but wasteful in terms of number of matches. It is thus reasonable to pursue frugality, that is, when implementing
a social choice function, select a mechanism with the smallest number of matches.
4. The results
This section presents answer to the question asked earlier: what mechanisms are truthful and implement the desirable
social choice functions.
4.1. Implementation by generalized round-robin mechanisms
We say that a matrix Cn×n is double-decreasing if ci1, j1  ci2, j2 whenever i1  i2 and j1  j2 hold simultaneously.
Theorem 1.
1. A generalized round-robin mechanism M is dominant strategy truthful iff its score matrix Cn×n is double-decreasing.
2. If a generalized round-robin mechanism M truthfully implements a social choice function f in dominant strategies, then
• f is player anonymous;
• f is team anonymous iff the score matrix satisﬁes C = CT , where C T is the transposition of C ;
• f is monotonic iff the score matrix of M has no negative entry.
Proof.
1. ⇒: If M is dominant strategy truthful, without loss of generality, suppose there exist i, j such that ci, j < ci+1, j . Now
consider such a state θ : b1 > b2 > · · · > bn−1 > a1 > · · · > ai,bn, . . . ,an . In other words, θ is a state where team A can
win only i matches against the worst player bn of B . Now if B reports bn as its j-th player, then if A reports honestly,
he will get c1, j + · · · + ci, j while if A swaps ai and ai+1, A will get a better score a1, j + · · · + ci−1, j + ci+1, j , which
contradicts the dominant strategy truthfulness of M .
⇐: If Cn×n is double-decreasing, for any state θ and any b ∈ B reported as j-th player, suppose according to θ , we
have a1 > · · · > ai > b > ai+1 > · · · > an . If A reports honestly, it will get c1, j + · · · + ci, j from b, otherwise, it will get
cm1, j + · · · + cmi , j . Since C is double-decreasing, we have c1, j, . . . , ci, j are the greatest i entries in column j of C , so
c1, j + · · · + ci, j  cm1, j + · · · + cmi , j . Since j and θ are arbitrarily chosen, we have that A is dominant strategy truthful.
2. This part follows from deﬁnitions. 
Note that, the score matrix in neither the horse racing example nor the table tennis example is double-decreasing.
According to Theorem 1, they are not dominant strategy truthful. In the table tennis example, if the state is as follows:
a1 > b1 > b2 > a2 > b3 > a3. Note that if both A and B report truthfully, B would lose the competition with 3 : 2. However,
if B misreport his order as b1 >′ b3 >′ b2 and A still reports truthfully, B would win the competition with 2 : 3.
We also remark that Theorem 1 still holds if we change the solution concept to ex post equilibrium.3 For the proof, we
only need to adjust the state θ in the proof of Theorem 1 to state θ ′ as
b1 > b2 > · · · > b j−1 > a1 > · · · > ai,b j, . . . ,an,b j+1, . . . ,bn.
3 Ex post truthfulness says that, regardless of the state, it is in each team’s best interest to report truthfully, as long as the other team also reports
truthfully.
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1. The generalized round-robin mechanism truthfully implements fBC in dominant strategies if its score matrix Cn×n = 1n×n, where
1n×n is the matrix with every entry being 14;
2. The generalized round-robin mechanism truthfully implements fMax in dominant strategies if its score matrix satisﬁes c1,1 = 1
and ci, j = 0 otherwise;
3. There is no generalized round-robin mechanism truthfully implements either fHR or fMin in dominant strategies.
Proof.
1. It is not hard to see that for 1n×n , the mechanism simply counts the sum of the number of opponents that are weaker
for each player. Moreover, it is non-decreasing. So it truthfully implements fBC minus a constant
n(n−1)
2 in dominant
strategies. The constant stands for the sum of additional scores if they are allowed to play with their own team mates.
2. This part follows directly from deﬁnition.
3. • Suppose M with score matrix C truthfully implements fHR . Now consider θ : a1 > b1 > · · · where fHR(θ) = (sA, sB),
then by only swapping a1 and b1 in θ , we obtain θ ′: b1 > a1 > · · · , where fHR(θ ′) = (sA − 1, sB + 1). This is possible
only if c1,1 = 1. Similarly, consider θ ′′: · · · > an > bn where we have fPC(θ ′′) = (s′A, s′B). Again, by swapping an and bn ,
we obtain θ ′′′: · · · > bn > an where fPC(θ ′′′) = (s′A − 1, s′B + 1). This is possible only of cn,n = 1. Since M is dominant
truthful, we have C is non-increasing, which further implies C = 1n×n . However, 1n×n obviously does not implement
fHR . A contradiction.
• Suppose M with score matrix C truthfully implements fMin . Now consider θ : a1 > b1 > · · · where fHR(θ) = (sA, sB),
then by swapping a1 and b1 in θ , we obtain θ ′: b1 > a1 > · · · , where fHR(θ ′) = (sA, sB), as long as n  2. This is
possible only if c1,1 = 0. Similarly, consider θ ′′: · · · > an > bn where we have fPC(θ ′′) = (s′A, s′B). Again, by swapping
an and bn , we obtain θ ′′′: · · · > bn > an where fPC(θ ′′′) = (s′A − 1, s′B + 1). This is possible only of cn,n = 1. We now
have cn,n = 1> c1,1, contradicting to the truthfulness condition. 
We remark that the current international team competition for tennis (aka Davis Cup) uses a generalized round-robin
mechanism whose score matrix is 12×2, thus it implements Borda Count.
4.2. Implementation by sequential mechanisms
Unlike a generalized round-robin mechanism, the preference P of which is a total order relation on a constant-sum
set of outcomes, there are cases where P is not complete for non-constant-sum sequential mechanisms. Thus, it makes
sense to focus on certain speciﬁc mechanisms. We now introduce a particular class of sequential mechanisms called “knock-
in” competition in contrast to the “knock-out” one mentioned in Example 2.3. In a knock-in competition, the loser of the
previous match stays to compete with the winner’s successive team mate.
Deﬁnition 4.1 (Knock-in competition). Upon receiving the reported lists of players {a1, . . . ,an} and {b1, . . . ,bn},
• a1 vs b1 is initiated as the ﬁrst match.
• In the following rounds, let the current match be ai vs b j , the next function assigns ai+1 vs b j if ai beats b j and
ai vs b j+1 otherwise.
• The set of terminal histories are those where every player has won in one team, which we call the winning team. The
other team is called the losing team.
Note that the losing team does not necessarily lose the competition in terms of score. The observation below follows
immediately from deﬁnition.
Observation.
1. Every knock-in competition has a number of at most 2n − 1 matches.
2. By assigning 1 to the winning team and 0 to the losing team in each terminal history, the knock-in mechanism always
yields an outcome that coincides with the one prescribed by fMin , and therefore truthfully implements fMin in dominant
strategies.
We remark similarly that a knock-out competition truthfully implements fMax , by assigning 1 to the winning team.
However, unlike knock-in competition which can implement many other social-choice functions as well, fMax is essentially
4 In fact, it implements Borda Count minus a constant n(n−1)2 .
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put this player on top and he will beat the whole other team in turn.
The ﬂexibility of designing a knock-in competition lies in the choice of scoring rules. The scoring rule should be designed
in a way such that, on the one hand, the preference for the set of terminal histories is well deﬁned and, on the other hand,
the scores align with the incentives of truth reporting. There are at least two possible classes of scoring rules.
4.2.1. Score by play order
With this type of scoring rule, we assign a constant score c1 to the winner of the ﬁrst match, c2 the second match, and
so on. Score and outcome are deﬁned as usual. Note that the number of matches in such a knock-in competition ranges
from n to 2n − 1. In order to preserve the constant-sum property, we assign 2n constants as follows:
Deﬁnition 4.2. In a score-by-play-order rule, we have a list of 2n constants {c1, c2, . . . , c2n}, we assign c1 to the winner
of the ﬁrst match, c2 the winner of the second match and so on. When reaching a terminal history after n0 matches,
n  n0  2n − 1, we assign the remaining constants cn0+1, . . . , c2n to the remaining players (the order does not matter). In
the end, each player receives a score.
In this way, we have sA + sB = ∑1i2n ci , a constant. The following theorem characterizes the dominant strategy
truthfulness of knock-in competitions with this type of scoring rules.
Theorem 3. For a knock-in competition M with a score-by-play-order rule,
1. M is dominant strategy truthful iff {c1, c2, . . . , c2n} is non-increasing.
2. If M truthfully implements a social choice function f in dominant strategies, then f is player anonymous, team anonymous,
monotonic.
3. M truthfully implements:
• fBC with {2n − 1,2n − 2, . . . ,1,0};
• fMax with {1,0, . . . ,0};
in dominant strategies.
Proof.
1. ⇒: If M is dominant strategy truthful and suppose {c1, c2, . . . , c2n} is not non-increasing. Without loss of generality, let
cm < cm+1. Suppose the m-th match is between ai and b j . Now consider a state
θ : ai > b j > ai+1 > b j+1.
If A reports truthfully, the competition goes as follows:
(a) ai beats b j , team A gets cm;
(b) ai+1 loses to b j , team B gets cm+1;
(c) ai+1 beats b j+1, team A gets cm+2.
If A swaps ai and ai+1, the competitions goes as follows:
(a) ai+1 loses to b j , team B gets cm;
(b) ai+1 beats b j+1, team A gets cm+1;
(c) ai beats b j+1, team A gets cm+2.
Thus by lying, team A gets a better outcome. A contradiction.
⇐: We ﬁrst introduce the notations for this part. Note that given a non-increasing score sequence, a knock-in mech-
anism can be fully characterized at any stage by a tuple (A′, B ′, c), where A′ and B ′ are the current lists of players
that stay in the competition and c is the current winning score. We denote U A(A, B, c) as the remaining score that
team A will get afterwards. Similar for team B . To show the dominant strategy truthfulness, it suﬃces to show that
U A(AT , B, c1)  U A(AU , B, c1) for any AU , where AT and AU are the truthful and untruthful lists of team A, respec-
tively. We now prove it by induction on the size of A and B .
• Base case: It is trivial that we have U A(AT , B, c1) U A(AU , B, c1) when |A| = 1 and |B| = 1.
• Inductive case: Assume that the claim holds when |A| + |B| < k. Now consider the case that |A| + |B| = k. Suppose
that B reports b1,b2, . . . ,bt as its play list and the truthful list for A is a1 > a2 > · · · > as . Compare the truthful and
untruthful reports of the ﬁrst player by A.5 There are two cases:
– Case 1. a1 < b1
(a) If A reported truthfully, b1 beats a1, A would then get a score of U A(AT , {b2, . . .}, c2).
5 In principle, we should also compare the case where A truthfully reports a1 as its ﬁrst player but misreports some players afterwards, however, this
case is covered in the inductive assumption.
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where A′ denotes the misreported list. We know that U A(AU , {b2, . . .}, c2) U A(AT , {b2, . . .}, c2) by inductive
assumption.
We conclude that in Case 1, truthful reporting is no worse than misreporting.
– Case 2. a1 > b1
(a) If A reported truthfully, a1 beats b1, A would then get a total score of c1 + U A({a2, . . .}, {b1,b2, . . .}, c2).
(b) If A misreported some other player ai , there are two subcases:
∗ Subcase 1. ai > b1. ai beats b1, A would then get a total score of c1 + U A(AU \ {ai}, {b1,b2, . . .}, c2). By
inductive assumption, this score is no more than c1 + U A(AT \ {ai}, {b1,b2, . . .}, c2). In the meanwhile, by
knowing ai > b1, we know that a j > b1 for all j < i. Thus, c1 + U A(AT \ {ai}, {b1,b2, . . .}, c2) = c1 + · · · + ci +
U A({ai+1, . . .}, {b1,b2, . . .}, ci+1). This is the exact score when A reported truthfully since it would win the
ﬁrst i matches in a row.
∗ Subcase 2. ai < b1. b1 beats ai , A would then get a score of U A(AU , {b2, . . .}, c2), which is no more than
U A(A, {b2, . . .}, c2) by inductive assumption. We will show in a later section that U A(A, {b2, . . .}, c2)  c1 +
U ({a2, . . .}, {b1,b2, . . .}, c2), which is the deﬁnition of moral hazard freeness.
We conclude in Case 2 that truthful reporting is also no worse than misreporting.
2. • Suppose that M truthfully implements a social choice function f in dominant strategies and f is not player anony-
mous, which means there exists one state where by swapping two players’ rankings of the same team, f yields
a different outcome for the new state. However, as we can see, this is impossible since the ﬂows of the knock-in
competition are exactly the same for both states.
• Similarly for team anonymous.
• Now consider monotonicity, suppose that M truthfully implements a social choice function f in dominant strategies
and f is not monotonic, which means when one player improves his overall ranking while the others remain the
same, f yields a worse outcome for that team. This amounts to saying that by giving up certain games and pretending
to be a weaker player, one can lead to a better outcome for his team. This contradicts to the fact that M is moral
hazard free, which will be proved later.
3. This part follows from the conclusion of part 1 as well as the deﬁnitions of fBC and fMax .
This completes our inductive proof. 
For example, to truthfully implement fBC , we ﬁrst let a1 play against b1 with the winner getting 2n − 1 and the loser
staying to compete with the next player of the other team, and so on. Since the earlier matches have higher scores and each
player would get a score anyway, each team then would like to win as early as possible, so truthful reporting is no worse
than misreporting.
Note also that the same result hold if we replace the solution concept by ex post equilibrium, the proof of which is
identical.
4.2.2. Score by position
With this type of scoring rule, we assign a score to each match similarly to what we did in the generalized round-robin
mechanism, except that each match is asymmetric: the score that ai gets from winning ai vs b j may not be the same as b j
gets from winning the same match. This asymmetry undermines the constant-sum property of the mechanism, however, as
we will show, it enables a knock-in competition to truthfully implement fHR . Further, to maintain the team anonymity, we
require that the score that ai gets from beating b j be the same as the score bi gets from beating a j . Therefore, only one
score matrix is needed to fully specify a scoring rule.
Deﬁnition 4.3. In a score-by-position rule with a score matrix Cn×n , for any match ai vs b j , ai gets ci, j if he wins and b j
gets c j,i otherwise.
As we mentioned, in general this type of mechanism is not constant-sum thus the preference relation may not be well
deﬁned. However, the main purpose to include it is that it can truthfully implement fPC in dominant strategies with certain
restrictions on C .
Theorem 4.
• A knock-in competition M with score-by-position rule is dominant strategy truthful if its score matrix satisﬁes ∀1 i, j, i+1, j+
1 n:
1. ci, j  ci, j+1  0.
2. ci, j  ci+1, j+1  0.
• A knock-in competition M with score-by-position rule truthfully implements fHR in dominant strategies with ci, j = 1 if i  j and
ci, j = 0 otherwise.
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• Note that, at any stage, the competition can be completely characterized by the current lists of players (A, B), thus the
remaining score that team A can get at this point can be denoted by U A(A, B), since the score matrix Cn×n is always
the same one thus can be omitted. We can see that the proof of the ﬁrst claim is identical to that of Theorem 3, when
we replace in the proof of Theorem 3 any instance of U A(A, B, ci) by U A(A, B), c1 by c1,1, . . . , and ci by ci,1. Note
also that, in competition with score by position rule, it is also necessary to consider the score UB of team B when
comparing score proﬁles. However, this part is symmetric to that of U A .
• First, if a mechanism with the score matrix C such that ci, j = 1 if i  j and ci, j = 0 otherwise, then it satisﬁes:
1. ci, j  ci, j+1  0.
2. ci, j  ci+1, j+1  0.
Thus according to the ﬁrst claim, it is dominant strategy truthful. The implementation of fHR then follows from the fact
that each player can get 1 point iff it beats some higher or equally ranked player. 
In other words, to implement fHR , we assign each player 1 point if he beats some higher ranked opponent while assign
each player 0 point if he loses to or wins against some lower ranked opponent. For example, if a3 beats b2, then a3 gets 1
and b2 gets 0, otherwise both a3 and b2 get 0. This indicates a higher ranked player can never score by competing with a
lower ranked player, but he still has to win so that his lower ranked team mates can have a chance to score.
Till now, we have solved the horse racing problem introduced at the beginning of the paper.
4.3. Knock-in competition minimizes the number of matches
We know that in general a generalized round-robin mechanism schedules O (n2) matches in comparison to O (n) matches
in a knock-in competition to truthfully implement a social-choice function. A natural question is if there exists any other
mechanism that can do better. We now give a negative answer by proving that knock-in competition is worst-case optimal.
Deﬁnition 4.4 (Worst-case optimal). A mechanism M is worst-case optimal with respect to a social-choice function f if M
truthfully implements f and M schedules the minimum number of matches in its worst case.
In other words, suppose KM is the minimal number of matches that suﬃces to guarantee the termination of M for any
state. M is worst-case optimal means KM  KM′ for any M ′ .
Theorem 5.
• If a knock-in competition M truthfully implements a social-choice function f that is one-to-one, then M is worst-case optimal
with respect to f .
• If a knock-in competition M truthfully implements fBC , then M is worst-case optimal with respect to fBC . The same holds for fMax.
Proof.
• Since f is one-to-one, truthfully implementing f implies ﬁguring out the true state given that the two teams reported
truthfully. This is the problem of merging two sorted lists using minimum number of comparisons. Now consider the
worst case for any knock-in competition, that is, when players from each team appear alternatively in the state,
a1 > b1 > a2 > b2 > · · · > an > bn.
Knock-in competition needs (a1,b1), (b1,a2), . . . , (an,bn), 2n − 1 matches to ﬁgure out this state. However, to tell this
state apart, any of these matches has to be made explicit. Suppose not, say we omit (b1,a2), then we are not be able
to tell the original state from the following state
a1 > a2 > b1 > b2 > · · · > an > bn.
One can similarly verify other matches. This means knock-in minimizes the number of matches in its worst case (not
necessarily the worst case of other mechanism), thus we prove its worst-case optimality. In fact, one can view the
knock-in competition as the simulation of the ‘merge’ procedure in the standard merge-sort algorithm, which is known
to be worst-case optimal when merging two sorted lists with an equal number of elements.
• Now we prove that knock-in competition is optimal for fBC . Note that, although fBC is not one-to-one, fBC still produces
different values for the two states constructed in the previous part of the proof. Thus, to tell the two states apart,
the comparison between (b1,a2) still has to be made explicit. One can verify this is true for any other comparison
listed above. Thus fBC makes no difference to one-to-one in this sense and the proof above follows. For fMax , knock-in
implements it in only one match with score by play order rule {1,0,0, . . .}. 
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implements. The answer is aﬃrmative. First note that, knock-in mechanism can truthfully implement any decreasing scoring
function – a social-choice function in which each player is assigned a score that is a monotonic function of his rank in the
state and the associated outcome is computed by the sum of scores of each team – by trivially assigning each match the
score of the corresponding rank. The following decreasing scoring function is one-to-one.
Example 4.1 (Borda Count with taxes). We consider a variation of Borda Count by imposing a different tax rate of each rank.
For instance, suppose each team has two players, the best player gets 4 × (1 − 4%), the second 3 × (1 − 3%), the third
2× (1− 2%) and the last 1× (1− 1%). One can verify that this is a one-to-one social-choice function which can be trivially
implemented by a knock-in competition.
One implicit assumption that we need to address is that the two teams have an equal number of players. Without the
assumption, we do not know if the above theorem still holds, since the knock-in procedure is somewhat redundant for
identifying the true state in this case. In fact, Knuth ([7], Chapter 5.3.2, Exercise 8) demonstrated a procedure that can
merge any sorted list of length 2 with any another of length 8 in 6 comparisons (while knock-in needs 9 in the worst-case).
However, it does not negate our theorem since that procedure is not truthful.
Notice that we do not mention fHR or fMin in our theorem. As we shall introduce in the next subsection, we can do
even better than knock-in with respect to fHR and fMin by allowing randomization.
4.4. Randomized sequential mechanisms
As mentioned, if we are allowed to randomize the next function (that is, non-deterministically select the next match) in
sequential mechanism, we can further design truthful mechanisms that are even more compact than knock-in. For instance,
the following mechanism truthfully implements fHR in only n+ 1 matches.
A reports a1, . . . ,an and B reports b1, . . . ,bn , the mechanism schedules the following n+ 1 matches:
Example 4.2 (Implementing horse race in n + 1 matches).
1. a1 vs b1, the winner gets 1 and the loser gets 0;
2. a2 vs b2, the winner gets 1 and the loser gets 0;
.
.
.
n. an vs bn , the winner gets 1 and the loser gets 0;
n+ 1. ai vs b j , where ai and b j are uniformly selected from A and B respectively, the winner and the loser gets 0.
However if we detect one of the following cases,
1. j < i, bi beats ai and ai beats b j ;
2. j > i, b j beats ai and ai beats bi ;
we eject team B , which is an outcome equivalent to giving team B −∞ in payoff.
Similarly, if we detect one of the following cases,
1. j < i, ai beats b j and b j beats a j ;
2. j > i, a j beats b j and b j beats ai ;
we eject team A.
One can see that if some team takes the advantage of misreporting and win certain game by mismatch, there is always
a positive probability (1/n2) that it will be detected in the (n + 1)-th match and gets severe punishment. In this way, this
mechanism prevents manipulation. Similarly, we can truthfully implement fMin in two matches.
Example 4.3 (Implementing Min in 2 matches).
1. an vs bn , the winner gets 1 and the loser gets 0;
2. an vs b j or ai vs bn , where ai and b j are uniformly selected from A and B respectively, the winner and the loser get 0.
The detection and punishment techniques are similar to Example 4.2.
We can see that, if one team beneﬁts from misreporting in a deterministic sequential mechanism, it can be detected
with positive probability using an additional match where the players are randomly chosen. In other words, using this
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on the scoring rules.
However, note also that the assumption of moral hazard freeness (introduced in the next section) is essential in this
example since one team could throw the detecting (or some other) match to get the other team punished.
5. Moral hazard freeness
One assumption on the environment is that once a state θ deﬁnes a >θ b, a always beats b. This is the case when players
are non-strategic individuals. For instance, each player is a card in some card game.
However, sometimes a team has another level of strategic behavior by letting its players throw certain matches if it leads
to an increase in its score. Similar phenomenon is referred to as moral hazard in the principal-agent model [9].
For example, if we assign a suﬃciently large score to the second match in a knock-in competition, each team’s best
player would rather pretend to be a weaker player in order to compete the second match. This also happens when there
are negative entries in the score matrix of a generalized round-robin mechanism.
The best way to tackle this is to ensure “playing one’s best” as a dominant strategy of a team. In other words, no matter
what the other team does, it is always no worse to do one’s best. However, we argue that achieving moral-hazard freeness in
dominant strategy is sometimes diﬃcult, if possible. To illustrate, consider in generalized round-robin mechanism a strategy
that “if we win the match with the minimal score, we will give up the remaining ones”. Obviously, the other team has no incentive
to play their best since the current match does not outweigh the sum of the remaining matches. As a compromise, we use
the following deﬁnition, which amounts to moral-hazard freeness in Nash equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 5.1 (Moral-hazard freeness).
• For a generalized round-robin mechanism C and a message proﬁle (A, B), let U A(A, B,C) be the score A gets when
both team compete with their full strength. We say C is moral-hazard free if
U A(A, B,C) U A
(
A, B,C ′
)+ ci, j,
where C ′ differs from C only in that c′i, j = 0. Similar condition is required for UB .
• For a sequential mechanism D with current history h, current players (ai,b j) and a message proﬁle (A, B), denote
U A(A, B,h) the score A gets when both team compete with their full strength. We say D is moral-hazard free if
U A
(
A, B,h :: (b j > ai)
)
 U A(A, B,h) U A
(
A, B,h :: (ai > b j)
)
.
Similar condition is required to for team B .
It follows from a simple backward induction that the above deﬁnition amounts to saying that when the other team
always plays its best, it is no worse to play our best. That is, playing one’s best is a Nash equilibrium.
The following theorem summarizes the result of moral hazard freeness in both generalized round-robin and sequential
mechanisms.
Theorem 6.
1. A generalized round-robin mechanism is moral hazard free iff its score matrix C has no negative entry.
2. A knock-in competition with score-by-play-order rule is moral hazard free iff {c1, c2, . . . , c2n} is non-increasing.
3. A knock-in competition M with score-by-position rule is moral hazard free if its score matrix satisﬁes ∀1 i, j, i + 1, j + 1 n,
(a) ci, j  ci, j+1  0,
(b) ci, j  ci+1, j+1  0.
Proof. The theorem is a special case of Theorem 7. 
It is interesting that for knock-in competitions, the conditions that characterize moral hazard freeness coincide with
those of dominant strategy truthfulness. As a result, as long as these conditions are satisﬁed, the resulting mechanism is
both truthful and moral hazard free.
It is also not hard to see that both randomized mechanisms introduced in the previous section are not moral hazard free
since there is no incentive for them to play their maximal strength in the detecting match, which, on the contrary, provides
incentive for them to throw a match and get the other team punished.
6. Generalization of the results
In this section, we generalize the previous results in two different directions.
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We have considered an outcome to be a pair of real numbers representing the scores that each team will receive at
the end of the competition. One could argue that in many cases, what really matters is who wins the competition. In our
two-team competition setting, this can be done by assuming three possible outcomes 1 (team A won), 0 (tie), and −1 (team
A lost) (cf. [16]).
An interesting question then is how this will affect the results so far. First of all, we notice that instead of changing
the set of outcomes, the same effect can be achieved by changing the preference relation P into the following ordering:
A strictly prefers (sA, sB) over (s′A, s′B) iff either
sA > sB and s
′
A  s′B
or
sA = sB and s′A < s′B
and is indifferent to (sA, sB) and (s′A, s′B) iff either
sA > sB and s
′
A > s
′
B
or
sA = sB and s′A = s′B
or
sA < sB and s
′
A < s
′
B .
It is similar for team B ’s preference.
One can reason that, if a condition is suﬃcient for dominant strategy truthfulness (or implementation of a social choice
function), then it is also suﬃcient here because the weak preference persists (o1 is weakly preferred to o2 before implies o1
is weakly preferred to o2 now). However, a previously necessary condition may not hold now. For example, one can verify
that the generalized round-robin mechanism with the following score matrix C2×2:[
9 10
10 0
]
is dominant strategy truthful although it is not double-decreasing.
6.2. Probabilistic match outcomes
One could also argue that in many realistic cases, it is not always the case that the stronger player deterministically beats
the weaker player. This is true, especially in sports where one exciting thing is the uncertainty about the match outcome
even though the rankings of players are usually common knowledge.
Probabilistic play models abound. Knuth [8] introduced a model for the knockout tournament problem. He assumed a
linear ordering x1, x2, . . . of strengths among players where xi always beats x j when j  i + 2 and xi beats x j only at
probability p when j = i + 1. Graham et al. [5] introduced an alternative model by assuming xi beats x j with probability
p for any i, j such that i < j. Yet, the most popular one is the so-called monotonic model6 [6,13], widely adopted in the
knockout tournament literature, an area that is concerned with reasonably seeding players in a knockout tournament. It is
formally deﬁned as follows,
Deﬁnition 6.1 (Monotonic model). Suppose all the players are linearly ordered according to their strengths x1 > x2 > · · · > xn ,
there is a probability matrix Pn×n , whose entry pi, j speciﬁes the chance that xi beats x j in a match. Further, Pn×n satisﬁes
the following constraints,
1. pi, j + p j,i = 1,
2. pi, j  p j,i if i < j,
3. pi, j  pi, j+1.
6 We overload the notation of monotonicity, which could also denote an axiom of social-choice function. Each appearance should be clear from the
context.
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to fully specify a state. We can condense this matrix into an n×n one by eliminating the entries describing matches within
the same team. Thus, the above deﬁnition can be translated in the context of team competition as follows,
Deﬁnition 6.2 (State). A state θ speciﬁes a linear ordering >θ on A ∪ B and a play matrix Pn×n , whose entry pi, j speciﬁes
the chance that ai beats b j . Further, Pn×n satisﬁes the following constraints,
1. pi, j  0.5 if ai >θ b j ,
2. pi, j  0.5 if b j >θ ai ,
3. pi, j  pi,k if bk >θ b j ,
4. p j,i  pk,i if a j >θ ak .
The deﬁnitions for other parts of team competition environment as well as two types of mechanisms remain unchanged.
One should be able to conclude that the linearly ordering >θ (not necessarily unique, but equivalent for the purpose
of this paper) can be derived from the play matrix Pn×n if Pn×n satisﬁes the above constraints. Therefore, a state can be
completely characterized by its play matrix.
As one can see, as long as a play matrix has no zero entry, any team can completely beat the other. In this subsection,
we compute their expected scores whenever mentioning truthfulness, that is, the expectation of the sum of scores from
individual matches.
For constant-sum mechanisms such as generalized round-robin mechanism as well as sequential knock-in competition
with rule of scoring by play order, it is apparent that any expected score proﬁle is still constant-sum. Hence, the preference
R deﬁned at the beginning of the paper is still complete for the set of expected score proﬁles.
Furthermore, to deﬁne the corresponding properties of social choice function based on the new deﬁnition of state, player
anonymity and team anonymity remain unchanged. The corresponding new deﬁnitions of monotonicity and Pareto eﬃciency
are as follows,
Deﬁnition 6.3 (Monotonicity). For any two states θ and θ ′ , if f (θ) = o, f (θ ′) = o′ and θ ′ is an improvement to θ for team A,
then o′ is no worse than o for A. A state θ ′ is an improvement to another state θ for team A, if pi, j  p′i, j for all possible
i, j. The same holds for team B .
Monotonicity says that if in one team, every player weakly increases his chances against all players in the other team,
the team should not end up in a worse score.
Deﬁnition 6.4 (Pareto eﬃciency). If in any state θ , whose matrix P satisﬁes ∀i, pi,i > 0.5, then f (θ) = (sA, sB) implies sA  sB ,
and vice versa.
We still have that Pareto eﬃciency can be implied by team anonymity and monotonicity.
Proposition 6.1. A choice function f satisﬁes Pareto eﬃciency if it is both team anonymous and monotonic.
Proof. Suppose otherwise that P satisﬁes ∀i, pi,i > 0.5 and f (θ) = (S A, SB) satisﬁes sB > sA in state θ . One can imagine
that team B also has a play matrix P ′ such that p′i, j = 1 − p j,i is the probability that bi beats a j . We now transit to
another state θ ′ by letting each p′i, j be pi, j . Since pi, j  p′i, j (because ai > bi,a j > b j follows from ∀i, pi,i > 0.5), such a
transition is an improvement for team B . By monotonicity, we still have s′B > s′A in θ ′ . However, by team anonymity, we
have s′B = sA < sB = s′A , a contradiction. 
We are now ready to derive similar results to what we did in the deterministic case.
Theorem 7. In probabilistic settings, we have:
1. A generalized round-robin mechanism M is dominant strategy truthful iff its score matrix Cn×n is double-decreasing.
2. If a generalized round-robin mechanism M truthfully implements a social choice function f in dominant strategies, then:
• f is player anonymous;
• f is team anonymous iff the score matrix satisﬁes C = CT , where C T is the transposition of C ;
• f is monotonic iff the score matrix of M has no negative entry.
3. A generalized round-robin mechanism is moral hazard free iff its score matrix C has no negative entry.
4. • A knock-in competition with score-by-play-order rule is moral hazard free iff {c1, c2, . . . , c2n} is non-increasing;
• A knock-in competition with score-by-position rule is moral hazard free if its score matrix C satisﬁes ∀1 i, j, i + 1, j + 1 n,
(a) ci, j  ci, j+1  0,
(b) ci, j  ci+1, j+1  0.
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increasing.
6. For a knock-in competition K , if K truthfully implements a social choice function f in dominant strategies, then
• f is player anonymous, team anonymous, monotonic.
Proof. See Appendix A. 
Theorem 7 states that for generalized round-robin mechanisms as well as sequential mechanisms (with scoring by play
order), the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for truthfulness as well as moral hazard freeness remain the same in the
generalized probabilistic setting.
7. Related work
7.1. The Colonel Blotto game
We now give a related game called the Colonel Blotto game, a classic one that has been put forward for almost a century
until recently solved by Roberson [12] under some assumption. The game has found its resemblance and applications to
multi-object auctions where agents have budgetary limits [3,15]. It is as follows,
Example 7.1. The Colonel Blotto games.
• A two-person constant-sum game.
• Each player has a ﬁxed number of soldiers and is required to partition all his soldiers to a number of battleﬁelds.
• On each Battleﬁeld, the player that allocate the most soldiers wins.
• The payoff of each player is the number of battleﬁelds won.
The game has several variations include multiple players, incomplete information about other players’ budgets and dif-
ferent winning prizes for different battleﬁelds (cf. e.g. [1]). For its most original form, it can be considered as a class of team
competitions where each team does not know the other team’s partition (thus does not know the strength ordering either).
As a result, it is strictly more complex than team competition in the sense that it can be thought of as a two-state game
where the ﬁrst stage is for each team to partition the strength and the second is a speciﬁc team competition.
7.2. Mechanism design in sports
Our work can also be categorized as a game-theoretic treatment of designing desirable sports rules. Although it is original
in the context of team competition, there has been some parallel work on the tournament design problem. Vu et al. [16]
provided a computational treatment of seeding knockout tournament. Their main conclusion is that it is computationally
hard to maximize the winning probability of a target player by seeding. Thus, it assures that the designer cannot collude
with any player when the number of players is considerably large. Altman et al. [2] alternatively provided a social-choice
theoretical treatment of manipulations in tournament. Each tournament is treated as a social-choice function that maps
a strength state to a winner. They considered several desirable axioms on this setting and provided some possibility and
impossibility results.
8. Future work and concluding remarks
We now consider several topics for future research.
We have considered only mechanisms that require both teams to submit their players lists all at once. Sometimes,
however, the teams may regret about their original strategies after observing the results of the ﬁrst few matches. To ac-
commodate this “change of heart”, one can consider using games in extensive form where the teams can incrementally add
their players’ lists during a competition. For example, in a knock-in competition where there is no constraint among players’
strengths, at any stage of the competition. One could choose a player has a high chance to beat the current opponent but
low chances to beat the other remaining opponents.
It is also interesting to consider a more complicated setting where each match takes multiple players. Such examples
include various card games such as Bridge, in which a card can be considered as a player, and a hand of cards teams. Each
round can then be considered as a single match that takes multiple cards with the winner chosen and awarded certain
score according to the order of the cards. In this setting, a desirable mechanism would not necessarily need to be truthful,
but rather it should encourage strategic behaviors.
Instead of minimizing the number of matches, we can consider other criteria such as maximizing total revenue or
revenue per match. In this case, we need to deﬁne a model that maps strengths to revenue in each match and then
optimize the objective accordingly subject to truthfulness and other constraints. One possible way of implementing this is
to use the idea of automated mechanism design introduced by Conitzer and Sandholm [4].
764 P. Tang et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 174 (2010) 749–766To sum up, motivated by real world examples, we have formulated the team competition problem in the framework
of mechanism design. We have also proposed two typical forms of team competition, identiﬁed the desirable properties
that these competitions should satisfy and characterized the conditions under which our mechanisms satisfy the properties.
We have further generalized our results in two directions and discussed how randomization can help design more compact
mechanisms. For future work, it is worth further exploring sequential as well as randomized mechanism. It is also interesting
to deploy knock-in competition in real sports competitions as well as multi-agent scenarios.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 7
Lemma A.1 (Rearrangement inequality).
• If a1  · · · an and b1  · · · bn, then we have
a1b1 + · · · + anbn  a1bσ(1) + · · · + anbσ(n)  a1bn + · · · + anb1 .
• If a1 > · · · > an and b1 > · · · > bn, then we have
a1b1 + · · · + anbn > a1bn + · · · + anb1 , when n 2
where σ is any permutation of {1, . . . ,n}.
We now prove 1, 2, that is, the conditions for truthfulness and truthful implementation in generalized round-robin
mechanism remain the same.
Proof.
1. ⇐: If the score matrix C is double-decreasing, we show that truthful report is a dominant strategy for team A. From
the deﬁnition, the ﬁnal score of team A is the sum of the scores that they get by playing with every players in team B .
Suppose team B reports b j as their i-th choice, we now compare the expected scores team A gets from b j with and
without truthful report.
• Truthful report, that is, to report a1 > a2, . . . ,an:∑
k=1,...,n
pk, jck,i . (1)
• Otherwise, to report aσ(1), . . . ,aσ(n) , where σ is any permutation of {1, . . . ,n}:∑
k=1,...,n
pσ (k), jck,i . (2)
Since p1, j  p2, j  · · · pn, j by the deﬁnition of P , and c1,i  c2,i  · · · cn,i by the non-increasing property of C , (1)
 (2) then follows from Lemma A.1. Since i, j here are arbitrarily chosen, we have therefore proved this part.
⇒: If a generalized round-robin mechanism M is dominant strategy truthful, suppose otherwise that ci, j < ci+1, j for
some i, j, we compare the total expected score team A gets with and without truthful report, given team B reports
their truthful order b1 > b2, . . . ,bn .
• Truthful report:∑
k=1,...,n
∑
j=1,...,n
pk, jck, j. (3)
• Untruthful report b1 > · · · > bi+1,bi, . . . ,bn . That is, the one obtained from swapping bi+1,bi in the truthful report.∑
k =i,i+1
∑
j=1,...,n
pk, jck, j +
∑
j=1,...,n
pi+1, jci, j +
∑
j=1,...,n
pi, jci+1, j. (4)
We now construct a state θ whose play matrix P satisfying pi,l = pi+1,l , ∀l = j and pi, j > pi+1, j . It’s easy to see that it
is a well deﬁned play matrix. Now we get that
(3) − (4) = pi, jci, j + pi+1, jci+1, j − pi+1, jci, j − pi+1, jci, j.
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(3) − (4) < 0.
This implies that misreporting yields a better expected score for team A, which contradicts our assumption earlier that
M is dominant strategy truthful.
2. This part follows from the deﬁnition. 
Next, we prove 3, 4, that is, the conditions for moral hazard freeness in both generalized round-robin and knock-in
competitions still hold.
Proof. For 3, that is the condition of moral hazard freeness in generalized round-robin mechanisms follows directly from
the deﬁnition.
For the ﬁrst claim of 4, that is, sequential mechanism with rule of score-by-play-order, we ﬁrst introduce the notation
similar to what we did when proving Theorem 3. After several rounds, the remainder of a knock-in competition can be
completely characterized by a triple (Am, Bn, ci) where the lists of remaining players of teams A and B are Am with m
players, and Bn with n players respectively and the current winning score ci . We denote U A(Am, Bn, ci) the expected score
that team A gets from the remaining matches of the competition.
⇒: If a knock-in competition K is moral hazard free and suppose otherwise that ci < ci+1 for some i. Suppose when
the current score is ci , the rest of the competition is ({a′,a′′, . . .}, {b′,b′′, . . .}, ci). We can construct a state whose play
matrix says that a′ beats b′ and b′ beats a′′ both at probability 1. Now we can see that if team A play their best for
the ﬁrst two matches, they will end up with ci + U ({a′′, . . .}, {b′′, . . .}, ci+2), while they will end up with a higher score
ci+1 +U ({a′′, . . .}, {b′′, . . .}, ci+2) if they throw the ﬁrst match between a′ and b′ . This contradicts to the fact that K is moral
hazard free.
⇐: We prove this part by induction on m and n for competition (Am, Bn, ci). More speciﬁcally, we prove the following
hold for all m and n if ci  ci+1 for all i:
U A(Am, Bn, ci) U A(Am−1, Bn, ci+1) + ci, (5)
U A(Am, Bn, ci) U A(Am, Bn−1, ci+1). (6)
In fact (5) and (6) are equivalent to (7),
U A(Am−1, Bn, ci+1) + ci  U A(Am, Bn−1, ci+1), (7)
since
U A(Am, Bn, ci) = p
(
U A(Am−1, Bn, ci+1) + ci
)+ (1− p)U A(Am, Bn−1, ci+1).
• Base case: One can easy verify that when ci  ci+1 for all i, the above inequations hold for m′ = m,n′ = 1 and m′ =
1,n′ = n.
• Inductive case: Assume (7) (hence (5) + (6)) holds for all m′,n′ such that m′ + n′ m + n − 1, now we show that it
holds for m + n. We denote the left-hand side of (7) as LHS, and the right-hand side as RHS. By inductive assumption,
we have
U A(Am−1, Bn−1, ci+2) + ci  LHS.
Similarly, we have
U A(Am−1, Bn−1, ci+2) + ci+1  RHS,
since ci  ci+1, we have that LHS RHS. The inductive step holds as well.
As to the second claim in 4 concerning score-by-position rule, it follows from the same inductive proof as the above one
when we replace any instance of U A(A, B, c) by U A(A, B), ci by cm,n and ci+1 by cm,(n+1) . 
Note that this also proves Theorem 6.
At last, we prove 5, 6, the truthfulness conditions in knock-in mechanism still hold.
Proof. ⇒ The same counter-example in the proof of Theorem 3 also applies here.
For the ⇐ part, we are able to prove that this part holds where each team has two players. For general case, we believe
this condition still holds, however we do not have a proof at the moment. 
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